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Abstract 
The current debate on the international transmission of shocks generated by quantitative easing 
(QE) programmes mainly focuses on the impact on financial markets’ yields and returns. This 
paper adds to the literature by investigating the existence of an international bank lending 
channel activated by QE, focusing on the behaviour of US global banks. In particular, the 
empirical analysis explores the impact of the Federal Reserves’ QE policy on lending of foreign 
branches of US banks. The findings reveal significant policy-induced liquidity spillovers via 
foreign lending by US global banks during the QE policy implementation in the US, suggesting 
the existence of an international bank lending channel. This channel worked its way through 
different segments of the credit markets, depending on the relative importance of host 
countries. Overall, our findings highlight the role of global banks in channelling QE-created 
liquidity across borders, adding pressure to increasing debt levels in foreign countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Unconventional monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserves (Fed) following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers featured large-scale purchases of Treasury and Agency debt 
securities from non-bank sectors in the secondary markets. By expanding the central banks’ 
balance sheet, this type of quantitative easing (QE) policy has allowed the Fed to inject liquidity 
into the economic system via the creation of bank reserves (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004)2. 
QE in the US lasted almost six years in a three-stage chronological implementation: from 
December 2008 until March 2010 (QE1), from November 2010 until June 2011 (QE2 – phase 
1), from October 2012 until October 2014 (QE2 – phase 2). Overall, it involved the purchase 
of $3.5tr worth of securities resulting in an unprecedented expansion of banks’ excess reserves, 
which reached $2.4tr. 
To date, research has primarily focused on evaluating the effects of the unconventional 
monetary stimulus on domestic and foreign financial markets’ yields and returns and 
macroeconomic volatility (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Barroso et al., 2015; Borio, 2011; Chen et 
al., 2012; Mallick et al., 2017). The portfolio rebalancing channel has been identified as the 
key transmission conduit through which this type of QE policy feeds through the real economy 
(Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Blinder, 2010; Gagnon et al., 2011). Underpinned by the 
assumption of imperfect substitutability between money and financial securities, this channel 
is activated by private sector agents who, in response to lower long-term yields on assets 
repurchased by the central bank, turn to the purchase of other higher-yielding assets, such as 
corporate bonds and equities (Brunner and Meltzer, 1973; Tobin, 1969)3. The portfolio 
rebalancing channel can reach beyond national borders. Brana and Prat (2015) for instance find 
that excess global liquidity intensified by widespread implementation of unconventional 
monetary policies have spilled over emerging economies’ financial markets resulting in asset 
prices inflation. With particular reference to the US, Fratzscher et al. (2016) show that the 
second wave of QE has led to financial imbalances in emerging countries due to excessive 
liquidity build-up and the consequent pressure on asset prices, yields and currencies.  
 
 
2 As argued by Blinder (2010), an alternative form of QE is when by central banks exchange short-term for long-
term financial assets. This type of unconventional policy changes the asset composition of the central bank balance 
sheet rather than the size.    
3 Other possible transmission channels of QE work through variations in expectations, see Joyce et al. (2012) for 
a detailed discussion. Also, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) identify a number of risk premia 
channels.  
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Only limited attention has been paid to assessing whether the QE has worked its way 
through the economy via the bank lending channel (BLC), shifting the supply of credit granted 
by banks4. The existence of a domestic bank lending channel activated by unconventional 
monetary policy is confirmed in the work by Bowman et al. (2011) for Japan, Garcia-Posada 
and Marchetti (2016) for Spain and Rodnyasky and Darmouni (2017) for the US.  In particular, 
Rodnyasky and Darmouni (2017) find that the last wave of the QE programme in the US led 
to an increase of domestic commercial banks’ lending by 3%. Still, the existence of an 
international BLC activated by unconventional monetary policies, involving banks shifting 
their supply of loans abroad in response to QE, remains largely unexplored in the literature.  
This paper aims at filling this gap by investigating the international spillovers of QE 
through a BLC activated by US global banks, which were heavily involved in the 
intermediation of large volumes of asset repurchase transactions, crediting customers’ deposits 
accounts while expanding their excess reserves holdings. Joyce et al. (2012) argue that the 
amplification of a BLC attributable to QE programmes is dependent upon the nature of the 
newly created deposits, other than the health of banks5. If these are mainly short-term flighty 
wholesale deposits, then, the QE will not operate via a BLC as refinancing uncertainty would 
reduce banks’ willingness to extend new loans due to precautionary reasons. The BLC instead 
is activated when the newly created deposits are kept within the banking system as term or 
saving deposits, i.e. the QE liquidity is not reinvested in financial markets. Butt et al. (2014), 
for instance, show that in the UK QE did not operate via a BLC exactly because of the flighty 
nature of the deposits created by the programme.  The observed volatility in deposits supports 
the existence of a portfolio rebalancing channel as large proportions of newly created bank 
deposits were used to finance high yielding securities. The investigation of the existence of an 
international BLC activated by the QE programme in the US is motivated by the observed 
expansion in global operations of domestically headquartered banks witnessed in the recent 
years coupled with the increase in domestic time deposits and interoffice outflows.  
The focus on the international dimension of the BLC is here also justified by the high 
degree of globalisation of US banks. These latter have been found to transmit shocks across 
the borders by actively managing their liquidity on a worldwide basis via transactions in 
internal capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012). Narrowing domestic interest margins 
4 Joyce and Spaltro (2014) suggest that this gap in the academic debate may be due to the presumption that the 
deleveraging of banks during financial distress leads to a freeze of bank lending even in a liquidity-abundant 
environment (see for instance Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibanez, 2011). 
5 It is referred to as bank funding channel in their paper.  
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in conjunction with active internal capital markets might have stimulated US global banks to 
channel the increased domestic deposit base to foreign countries via their foreign branches.  
International spillovers of QE through credit expansion in foreign countries, i.e. an 
international BLC, remain broadly unexplored in the literature. A notable exception is the paper 
by Morais et al. (2015) in which the authors show that the significant presence of US and EU 
banks’ foreign affiliates in Mexico increased credit supply to local firms during the QE 
implementation period in the US. Liu and Pogach (2017) show that there is a complementarity 
between domestic and foreign lending of US global banks, implying that policy-induced liquid 
abundance at home is likely to increase foreign lending via foreign offices. The authors, 
however, do not explicitly explore the extent to which the US-based QE programme has 
increased foreign lending of US global banks. This paper contributes to the literature by 
extending the findings by Morais et al. (2015) providing a more comprehensive account of the 
effect of QE on the foreign operations of banks worldwide, focusing on US global banks. An 
ad-hoc dataset is used for this intent which contains balance sheet data of foreign branches of 
US banks by country of location, available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC). Dynamic panel regression analysis is employed with the aim to analyse 
lending trends of foreign offices of global banks in their host locations in response to the QE 
policy in the US.  
Overall, the findings reveals the existence of an international bank lending channel 
during the QE policy implementation in the US activated by global banks. In particular, the 
transmission of US-generated liquidity shocks across the borders has asymmetric impacts on 
the lending of foreign branches. In host-countries where foreign branches of US banks have 
larger activities, US QE significantly increased local loans secured by real estate and 
commercial loans. In international and offshore financial centres and in those host-countries 
where foreign branches have smaller activities, an international BLC was activated via 
interbank markets as local interbank lending increased in response to the QE programme in the 
US.  
Our findings have interesting policy implications. Global banks by reallocating 
liquidity across borders via internal capital markets may reduce the impact of the 
unconventional monetary policy on domestic lending. Also, the reallocation across the borders 
of QE liquidity via the banking system can have important repercussions on recipient countries’ 
level of debt and asset prices. As argued previously, existing literature acknowledges the 
inflationary pressure on assets prices following QE policies in third countries due an 
international portfolio rebalancing channel. An international BLC activated by global banks 
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may contribute to increasing debt levels in foreign countries impairing local monetary 
policymakers’ objectives and financial stability. Foreign branches of banks headquartered 
abroad comply with the financial regulation of the country where their parent is located. Still, 
in the event of an increase in local systemic risk or financial instabilities due to rising debt 
levels following large liquidity inflows into local credit markets via foreign banks, local 
regulators can resort to product-based macroprudential regulation on credit limit. The latter 
applies to all financial institution operating in a particular jurisdiction. That is, timely and well-
tuned macroprudential regulation in recipient countries may contain eventual undesired 
pressure on local debt markets due to third countries’ QE-generated liquidity spillovers via 
international banking.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the dynamics 
behind the existence of a BLC following QE as well as some stylised facts in support of the 
existence of an international BLC activated by US global banks. Section 3 presents the 
econometric methodology adopted and section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the robustness checks and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The bank lending channel, international spillovers and QE 
 
2.1 BLC and QE: An overview 
The credit view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism describes shocks 
propagation through the economy arising from variations in external finance premium, that is, 
the difference between the external and internal costs of funding faced by borrowers (Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The bank lending channel implied within this 
view refers to the amplification of monetary shocks by banks arising from an impairment in 
their funding capability due to rising external finance premium. The main assumption 
underpinning the BLC is the existence of credit market frictions, mainly in form of asymmetric 
information, which weaken the banks’ ability to raise non-reservable funding when a monetary 
policy contraction reduces demand deposits. The contraction in lending witnessed in the 
economy can then be explained by both a reduction of loan demand caused by traditional 
interest rate channels drivers and loan supply caused by banks hilting their liquidity creation.  
The empirical relevance of this channel has been repeatedly questioned in the past two 
decades as institutional changes in financial systems have eased the access to alternative non-
reservable sources of funds. Some scholars, on the other hand, argue that no matter how easily 
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a bank can find alternative source of funding, a BLC would still subsist due to the higher cost 
of non-deposits borrowings (Bernanke, 2007; Disyatat, 2010; Stein, 1998).  
Unconventional monetary policy can activate or amplify the BLC depending on the 
public’s willingness to reinvest QE money. In particular, as shown by Butt et al. (2014), the 
BLC can arise from QE to the extent to which extra deposit funding translates into stable 
deposits, i.e. time and savings. Fig.1 shows a stylised balance sheet of an economy with only 
one representative bank and the effect that the QE has on its balance sheet over a three-period 
horizon. In t=0, QE has not been implemented yet and the bank has total assets amounting to 
$200. The bank has a large share of claims in the form of long-term loans, worth $150, and the 
remaining assets have shorter maturity and are bundled together as ‘other assets’. On the 
liability side, debt is raised via demand deposits plus wholesale funding and term deposits. 
Liabilities are segmented in this way to disentangle the flighty, i.e. demand deposits and 
wholesale funding, from the non-flighty, i.e. term deposits, funding components. For 
simplicity, required reserves and capital are not considered in this stylised example.  
 
Fig. 1. QE and BLC for a representative bank 
 
 
In t=1 the central bank implements the QE policy (middle panel of Fig. 1) purchasing 
the equivalent of $50 in securities from the private sector. The bank intermediates this 
transaction by crediting the demand deposit of the private agents by $50 which is matched with 
an increase in (excess) reserves by $50. Overall, the bank’s balance sheet has increased by the 
amount of the QE transaction, i.e. $50, affecting only the demand deposits held at the 
commercial bank on impact. The right-hand panel of Fig. 1, i.e. in t=2, are shown the conditions 
under which a BLC exists. It is here assumed that part of the demand deposits, in this case $20, 
is used by the private sector to purchase other high yielding securities, and kept in the form of 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
$200 $200 Extra loans ($20)
$250 $250 $250 $250
Demand deposits and 
wholesale ($130)
Term deposits ($70)
Demand deposits and 
wholesale ($180)
Term deposits ($70)
Other assets ($50)
Other assets ($30)
Loans ($150)
Other assets ($50)
Term deposits ($100)
Demand deposits and 
wholesale ($150)
t=0 t=1 t=2
Loans ($150)
Reserves ($50) Reserves ($50)
Loans ($150)
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demand deposits in the system, while the remaining $30 is placed in term deposits. Comparing 
the balance sheet at t=2 versus that in t=0, the liability structure of the banks has changed and 
features a higher proportion of term deposits. This may lead banks to be more willing to extend 
loans replacing shorter term assets with longer term loans equal to, say, $20. In this way, also 
the asset composition will be altered by the QE. The eventual unwinding of QE in the medium 
term will drain the excess reserves and reduce the wholesale funding under the pre-condition 
of the existence of an external financial premium.  
 
2.2 An international BLC in the US? Some stylised facts 
In the US the effect of QE on domestic lending has been rather limited. As showed by   
Rodnyasky and Darmouni (2017) the effect on domestic loan supply by banks resulting from 
the QE programme was 3% at most, with important cross-sectional variations across banks for 
some of which the observed growth rate of loans was notably lower. These modest growth rates 
in domestic lending were witnessed notwithstanding the increase in the stable deposit base 
during the QE period.  Fig. 1.a (appendix) shows that long-term deposits of the private sector 
held at US banks, that is savings and small time deposits, have experienced a structural break 
in their trend, increasing notably since late 2008. At the same time, the ratio of loans and leases 
to long-term deposits has fallen steadily, stabilising only towards the length of the sample. 
This puzzling evidence can be explained by the US banks’ willingness to expand 
foreign, rather than domestic, lending. Foreign lending of US banks has indeed stretched out 
at an unprecedented scale since the start of the QE programmes, supporting the plausibility of 
an international BLC. Narrowing domestic net interest margins may partly explain the increase 
in foreign loans provisions by US banks: in most of the countries in which US global banks 
have a large presence via their branches lending rates are higher than US ones, as shown in 
Fig.2.a. Domestic and foreign lending behaviour of US banks have indeed depicted somewhat 
different trends in the post-crisis QE era, i.e. December 2008 – October 2014. Outstanding 
domestic loans in the US have stagnated especially during the 2010-13 period, whilst picking 
up at a rather fast rate only from 2014 onwards (Fig 3.a, appendix). Over the period 2008q4 – 
2014q4 local claims of foreign offices of US banks have increased by over 55%, expanding by 
over $600bn (Fig.4.a). This evidence is in stark contrast with trends of international banking 
observed globally. As pointed out by Forbes et al. (2017) the post-crisis era is characterised by 
a de-globalisation of banking, especially as far as international capital flows are concerned. 
While unconventional monetary policies implemented in several parts of the world have 
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resulted in a retrenchment of cross-border flows, this does not seem to be the case for lending 
of foreign offices in the case of US global banks. 
The observed expansion in foreign credit has been coupled with a decrease in 
geographical dispersion of foreign banking activities of US global banks. The number of host 
countries in which US banks have assets in excess of $250m has decreased from over 70 before 
the crisis to 40 at the end of 2013. Nonetheless, the loans extended by these entities has grown 
at a remarkable rate since late 2009 (Fig. 5.a).  
Further support to the presumption that part of the extension in foreign credit may have 
been financed with QE-created liquidity in the US is advanced in Fig. 6.a (appendix) which 
shows that the three waves of QE policy implementation were matched with a surplus in net 
interoffice accounts of US banks resident domestically vis-à-vis their foreign affiliates. This 
constitutes a shift from the historical trend that sees US-located banks having largely negative 
net interoffice positions (assets minus liabilities) with affiliates located abroad.  
 
3. Econometric model 
 
3.1 Data and estimation strategy 
The foreign branch report of condition (FFIEC 030 report) is compiled by the FFIEC 
with the intent to monitor foreign operations of US banks. Within this report, foreign branches 
of US-chartered banks with assets in excess $250 million disclose rather segmented balance 
sheet data. The frequency of reporting is dependent on the size of operations of the 
branch: quarterly for operations in excess of $2 billion and annually otherwise6. Although 
branch level reports are confidential, balance sheet data of foreign branches aggregated by host 
country can be obtained upon request7. The ad-hoc unbalanced panel used in this paper contains 
selected balance sheet variables of foreign branches of US global banks located in 94 host 
countries over the period 1990-2015.  
The empirical investigation is based on the approach proposed by Ashcraft (2006) and 
Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibanez (2011). The identification strategy of local credit supply by 
foreign branches of US banks in this paper, however, accounts for financial constraints that 
arise at the host country level rather than at the individual institution level, given the nature of 
6 Branches with total assets more than $50 million and less than $250 million file the FFIEC 030S report form; 
these are excluded from the empirical analysis presented in the paper. 
7 FFIEC 0030 data has been seldom analysed in the literature. Two notable exceptions are Liu and Pogach 
(2017) and D’Avino (2017).  
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the data8. Following a monetary policy shock, changes in net worth of borrowers affecting 
credit demand, are difficult to disentangle from banks’ altered capacity to supply loans. Hence, 
the identification of the BLC requires the detection of the type of demand-independent financial 
constraint whose cross-sectional variation can explain the different impact of monetary policy 
on loan provision by banks. Cross-sectional financial constraints faced by banks can be due to 
size (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), liquidity (Kashyap and Stein, 1997), leverage and 
capitalisation (Kishan and Opiela, 2000) and affiliation with a bank-holding company 
(Ashcraft, 2006). The identification strategy has to be carefully tailored to the task of the 
research. The aim of the empirical methodology presented in this paper is to evaluate the impact 
of US unconventional monetary policy on loan supply of foreign branches of US banks. If US 
monetary policy has an effect on the lending of these latter entities, as suspected here, then it 
is reasonable to assume that local loan demand is unaffected by such foreign shock. Credit 
quality of local borrowers is, on the other hand, clearly dependent on host-countries’ monetary 
policy stances.  
Variation in financial constraints faced by US banks by country of location may be due 
to different factors. A first set of factors can be traced back to the aggregate balance sheet of 
foreign branches by host country. Aggregate size can be a potential candidate as relative foreign 
importance may be associated with varying degree of access to wholesale funding. Large 
foreign operations, indeed, typically occur in international financial centres in which US banks 
play a key role and have easier access to pool of non-deposit liquidity. High reliance on 
liquidity raised from interbank and other wholesale markets may also explain the 
heterogeneous impact of US monetary shocks on loan supply of branches located abroad. Host-
country variation in financial constraints faced by branches of US banks may also be due to 
local institutional and regulatory arrangements. Although foreign branches comply with 
Federal Reserve regulation, local restriction on banks’ access to capital markets can hinder the 
availability of non-deposit funding at the branch level. These variations in financial constraints 
are formally accounted for in the empirical investigation that follows to identify local credit 
supply of foreign branches.  
 
 
 
8 Using aggregated balance sheet data has also the added advantage to allow for the assessment of the overall 
impact of the BLC on aggregate credit, in the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder (1992). 
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 The estimated econometric model has the following form:  
∆ln (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 ∆ln (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ Λ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + Ξ𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + Π𝑊𝑊𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡−1+ (𝜓𝜓0 + 𝜓𝜓1 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
  (1) 
Where i , i=1,…,I, refers to the host countries in which foreign branches of US banks are 
located over the sample period t=1,…, T. 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 captures host country specific, time invariant 
effects capturing local institutional and regulatory arrangements. ∆ln (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the change 
in the logarithm of loans granted by foreign branches of US banks located in i. These include 
loans and leases secured by real estate, due from depository institutions and commercial and 
industrial claims (net of unearned income). Some specifications also consider as dependent 
variable the breakdown of total loans, expressed also in first-differenced logs, in loans secured 
by real estate, MORTG, commercial and industrial loans, COMM, and loans to depository 
institutions, INT.  
The vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 contains lagged balance sheet variables of branches by host country. 
These include the log of total assets, SIZE, non-deposit funding as a ratio to assets, 
WHOLESALE, interbank deposits as a ratio to assets, IBK, and interoffice liabilities as a ratio 
to assets. These latter are further segmented into liabilities due to branches, IO_BRA, and 
subsidiaries, IO_SUB, and are available from 2003 onwards only.  
The vector 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 contains lagged host country macro controls: change in interest rates, 
DIR, and real GDP growth, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺. The vector 𝑊𝑊𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡−1 contains lagged US controls. These 
include change in fed policy rate, US_IR_G, real GDP growth, US_GDP_G, and the logged 
difference of the excess reserves held by US banks to assets, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 to account for the 
unconventional monetary policy carried out by the Fed. In order to empirically capture the 
mechanism at work as described in section 2.1, a quantitative-based measure of monetary 
policy proxy of this kind is particularly suitable. As showed by Apergis and Christou (2015) 
and Heryan and Tzeremes (2017), the ability of a policy-steered interest rate to affect bank 
lending is impaired when interest rates approach the zero lower bound. The interaction variable 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡−1 captures the second wave of QE where QE is a time dummy that takes the 
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value of 1 over the following periods: November 2010 - June 2011 (QE2 phase 1) and October 
2012 - October 2014 (QE2 phase 2)9.  
Model (1) is estimated by means of a dynamic Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM), as pioneered by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). In particular, it is here used the orthogonal deviation estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995). This methodology corrects for endogeneity by including lagged 
differences of the dependent variable in the instruments list10. The estimates are consistent and 
unbiased in the absence of autocorrelation (tested by AR(p) test) providing that the Sargan-
Hansen  test for over-identifying restrictions supports the validity of the instruments.  
In order to avoid loss of information due to the unbalanced nature of the panel 
constructed from the FFIEC030 survey, two different strategies are used to estimate (1) as 
further detailed in the next two sections.  
 
3.2. Quarterly dataset 
A first set of specifications is estimated using quarterly data, capturing the effect of US 
QE on local lending by large and medium foreign branches which compile the FFIEC030 report 
on a quarterly basis; these host countries can be considered as core locations. Only for a handful 
of host countries quarterly data is available consistently over the 1990-2015 sample; this is the 
case for: The Bahamas, Belgium, Cayman Island, England, Hong Kong, Japan, Puerto Rico 
and Singapore. For a number of host countries, foreign branches of US banks started reporting 
consistently on a quarterly basis from mid/late 1990s. This is the case for: Australia, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand. In Canada and 
Germany quarterly consecutive reporting starts in early 2000s. There are a number of host 
countries for which data is reported mainly quarterly with little gaps, such as Argentina, 
Bahrain, Channel Islands, Chile, China, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain. For such host 
countries with limited data gaps linear interpolation is used to obtain a quarterly balanced panel. 
Two dummies are further used to identify international and offshore financial centres (IFC). 
Small financial centres, as identified by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2013) – The Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Cayman Islands and Channel Islands – are capture by IFC. The same set of countries 
including England is captured by IFC_E.  
9 QE1 is disregarded as banks retained most of the QE liquidity to make up for losses incurred in their balance 
sheet.   
10 Instruments also include lagged exogenous variables. US controls are here treated as exogenous.   
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Time dummies are included in all specifications to account for changes in local loan 
demand. The final sample for the quarterly analysis comprises a total of 29 host countries, 
listed in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Core host countries 
ARGENTINA GERMANY PUERTO RICO 
AUSTRALIA HONG KONG SINGAPORE 
BELGIUM INDIA SOUTH AFRICA 
BRAZIL INDONESIA SPAIN 
CANADA IRELAND SWITZERLAND 
CHILE ITALY TAIWAN 
CHINA JAPAN THAILAND 
ENGLAND KOREA, SOUTH   
FRANCE  PHILIPPINES   
Small Offshore Financial Centres (IFC) 
THE BAHAMAS CAYMAN ISLANDS   
BAHRAIN CHANNEL ISLANDS   
 
3.3. Annual dataset 
The annual dataset includes those host countries in which US banks’ branches have 
total assets in excess of $250 million but less than $2bn which can be considered a secondary 
locations. A closer look at the data reveals a geographical shift in the size of foreign operations 
of US banks away from those locations with less substantial activities, i.e. which have mainly 
annual data. In 2005q4, in particular, a discontinuity of reporting is observed for a number of 
host countries such as Cameroon, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Peru, Senegal and Turkey. These countries are excluded from the sample as data relative to the 
QE implementation period is unavailable. The final dataset features variables for a total of 27 
host countries, as reported in Table 2. In these host countries foreign branches have relatively 
higher loan portfolios and low engagement in off-balance sheet activities compared to core 
host countries.  
 
Table 2: Secondary host countries 
ABU DHABI GUAM PAKISTAN 
ALGERIA GUATEMALA PANAMA 
BANGLADESH ISRAEL PARAGUAY 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS JORDAN SRI LANKA 
BRUNEI KENYA TUNISIA 
BULGARIA MACAU URUGUAY 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MALAYSIA VENEZUELA 
ECUADOR NETHERLANDS VIETNAM 
EGYPT NEW ZEALAND  VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S. 
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 Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of all the series included in the empirical 
analysis. On average, core host countries feature higher reliance on wholesale funding and on 
internal capital markets. Secondary locations, on the other hand, depict a relatively higher loan 
portfolio and GDP growth. The largest host countries by asset size are offshore financial centres 
such as Cayman Island and the Bahamas as well as England, all countries included in the 
quarterly panel. These are also the locations that feature relatively small loan to assets ratios.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
   Mean  Median 
 
Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
Quarterly 
COMM 0.005 -0.002 13.547 -11.189 1.131 2706 
INT -0.014 -0.008 17.208 -14.331 2.511 2152 
D(ln(loans)) 0.003 0.011 7.129 -7.830 0.550 2814 
DIR -0.106 0.000 59.884 -47.897 2.257 2600 
ResUS 0.040 0.012 1.760 -0.377 0.255 2755 
GDP 3.446 3.236 28.143 -17.929 3.676 2626 
IBK 0.072 0.035 0.764 0.000 0.098 2853 
IO_BRA 0.397 0.336 0.995 0.001 0.252 1421 
IO_SUB 0.092 0.035 0.938 0.000 0.130 1421 
MORTG -0.020 -0.003 19.750 -10.454 1.127 1988 
SIZE 16.017 15.741 21.146 9.335 1.644 2853 
US_GDP_G 2.443 2.700 5.300 -4.100 1.808 2929 
US_IR_G -0.072 -0.005 0.727 -1.433 0.429 2900 
WHOLESALE 0.575 0.562 1.000 0.001 0.249 2853 
Annual 
COMM -0.019 -0.018 12.952 -7.865 1.070 604 
INT -0.319 -0.252 8.705 -9.560 2.894 166 
D(ln(loans)) 0.041 0.032 6.825 -6.042 0.675 660 
DIR -0.613 0.000 91.538 -119.281 8.201 514 
ResUS 0.040 0.004 0.866 -0.064 0.178 648 
GDP 4.371 4.419 26.755 -20.349 3.735 624 
IBK 0.047 0.007 0.992 0.000 0.093 701 
IO_BRA 0.208 0.177 0.909 0.000 0.144 350 
IO_SUB 0.022 0.002 0.397 0.000 0.060 349 
MORTG -0.054 -0.020 20.307 -11.165 1.729 287 
SIZE 13.000 13.118 15.793 4.078 1.267 702 
US_GDP_G 2.389 2.638 4.675 -2.775 1.679 702 
US_IR_G -0.072 -0.012 0.544 -1.085 0.379 675 
WHOLESALE 0.340 0.297 1.000 0.002 0.204 702 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on FFIEC 030 data. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Core host countries 
Table 4 reports the estimates of three specification of model (1) which differ with 
regards to liability-side variables considered and where DEPNT(p) refers to the lags of the 
dependent variable, ∆ln (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in this case. Wholesale/non-deposit funding is accounted for 
in the left-hand side panel (baseline regression) while the middle and the right-hand side panels 
report the regression estimates with the breakdown of non-deposit debt raised by foreign 
branches from interbank and internal capital markets.  
The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are significant and 
negative, implying that there is a tendency of the growth rate of loans to converge to a long-
run trend. The response of bank lending to local macroeconomic factors have the expected 
signs across specifications and are overall significant with local loan supply of foreign branches 
of US bank reacting negatively to local interest rates and positively to GDP growth. The effect 
of local interest rate on branches’ lending is not significant in the specification in the right-
hand side panel which is estimated on a smaller time sample due to data availability (starting 
from end-2003) suggesting that the link between local monetary policy and lending has broken 
down in the last decade or so. The estimated coefficient of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅_𝐺𝐺 is positive and significant 
in the first two panels for the 1990-2015 sample period. Lending of foreign branches of US 
banks increases in the range of 3.6-4% following a 1% increase in the Fed rate. This evidence 
suggests that global banks compensate a tightening in monetary policy-induced credit 
conditions in the US with an increase in their foreign lending. This result is in line with the 
arguments advanced by Goetz et al., (2013) and Markowitz (1952) who state that geographical 
diversification can allow banks to enhance their revenues and better shed from idiosyncratic, 
i.e. country-specific, shocks. The negative coefficient of SIZE can be explained by the fact that 
the activities of foreign branches are larger in IFC where they have substantial interoffice and 
interbank positions and little loans.  
The interaction variable is positive and significant across specifications suggesting an 
amplified effect of US monetary policy on lending of foreign branches of US banks during the 
QE. The estimated coefficients of interoffice liabilities of foreign branches during the QE 
period, as shown in the specification in the right-hand-side panel, are positive and strongly 
significant for both liabilities due to related branches and subsidiaries’ variables. This implies 
an intensification of internal borrowings of foreign branches of US banks during the QE 
implementation period in the US. Overall, these result suggests that global banks have 
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undergone significant liquidity reallocations via internal capital markets during the QE period 
in the US and that the increase in QE-created liquidity was distributed across the banking 
network to extend foreign lending.  
Table 4. GMM regression estimates, dependent variable: ∆𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 (𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍)𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕  
  Baseline regression Interbank liabilities Internal capital markets 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
DEPNT(-1) -0.309*** 0.020 -0.355*** 0.008 -0.358*** 0.020 
DEPNT(-2) -0.072*** 0.017 -0.092*** 0.005 -0.087*** 0.019 
GDP(-1) 0.012*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.002 
SIZE(-1) -0.059*** 0.016 -0.066*** 0.004 -0.060*** 0.021 
DIR(-1) -0.005*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.005 0.008 
US_GDP_G(-1) 0.208 0.205 0.099 0.125 0.615 0.681 
US_IR_G(-1) 3.610*** 0.114 4.027*** 0.582 0.163 16.968 
QE 0.267 0.694 -0.254 0.289 -0.014 1.217 
RESUS(-1) 0.079 0.575 -0.670 1.175 -8.894* 4.871 
RESUS(-1)*QE 3.052** 1.531 3.537** 1.807 12.478*** 4.837 
WHOLESALE(-1) 0.203*** 0.063 0.141*** 0.021 0.106 0.156 
WHOLESALE(-1)*QE -0.037 0.054 -0.009 0.024 -0.688*** 0.185 
IO_BRA(-1)         0.263 0.169 
IO_SUB(-1)         0.419** 0.186 
IO_BRA(-1)*QE         0.653*** 0.152 
IO_SUB(-1)*QE         1.131*** 0.171 
IBK(-1)     0.070* 0.039     
IBK(-1)*QE     -0.287** 0.128     
Sample 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 2003q4-2015q4 
Observations 2059 2059 1075 
Sargan-Hansen, p-value 0.178 0.732 0.489 
AR(2) 0.422 0.336 0.607 
Host-countries 23 23 23 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the baseline regression in which local loans (dependent 
variable) are broken down by loan type: secured by real estate, commercial and industrial and 
to depository institutions. The amplification effect of the excess reserves held by US banks on 
local loans secured by real estate (left-hand side panel) during the QE period is strongly 
significant. In particular, a 1% increase in excess reserves on the balance sheet of US banks 
located in the US on loans secured by real estate is on average 1.8% higher during the second 
and third waves of QE than otherwise. Also, the estimated coefficient of RESUS(-1)*QE in the 
middle panel suggests that a 1% increase in excess reserves on foreign commercial and 
industrial loans is 12% higher during the QE2 period than otherwise , albeit this estimate is 
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significant only at 10% confidence level. The estimated coefficient of RESUS(-1)*QE in the 
right-hand side panel of Table 5 reveals that the QE in the US had no incremental significant 
effect on interbank lending by foreign offices of US banks. 
Table 5. GMM regression estimates, local loans breakdown 
Dependent Variable: MORTG COMM INT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
DEPNT(-1) -0.835*** 0.007 -0.893*** 0.027 -0.935*** 0.048 
DEPNT(-2) -0.307*** 0.007 -0.454*** 0.018 -0.377*** 0.046 
GDP(-1) -0.000 0.001 -0.019* 0.010 -0.004 0.036 
SIZE(-1) -0.120*** 0.011 -0.178*** 0.062 -0.200 0.131 
DIR(-1) -0.015*** 0.004 0.034 0.026 -0.016 0.034 
US_GDP_G(-1) -0.305*** 0.019 0.261 0.373 -0.290 0.232 
US_IR_G(-1) 1.416*** 0.101 0.357 1.589 1.489** 0.747 
WHOLESALE(-1) 0.242*** 0.051 0.200 0.251 0.428 0.643 
WHOLESALE(-1)*QE -0.059 0.064 -0.314 0.349 0.530 0.348 
QE 0.059 0.061 -1.244 0.756 6.610 4.916 
RESUS(-1) -0.135 0.086 1.993 5.022 0.668 1.189 
RESUS(-1)*QE 1.786*** 0.630 12.291* 6.690 -89.464 68.237 
Sample 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 
Observations 1379 1980 1526 
Sargan-Hansen, p-value 0.930 0.708 0.100 
AR(2) 0.449 0.343 0.090 
Host-countries 22 23 23 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 below explores this result further by focusing on international financial centres 
as, in contrast to other locations, IFC have large interbank positions which may have been 
affected by the QE in the US11.  The two specifications consider the subgroups IFC and IFC_E 
in the left-hand and right-hand side panels respectively. The estimated coefficient of the QE 
dummy is significant and positive in both specifications, implying that interbank lending 
increased by 1.4% and 1.3% in the IFC and IFC_E groups respectively during the QE period. 
The interaction variable RESUS(-1)*QE is positive and strongly significant in the IFC group 
regression suggesting that during the QE in the US the impact on interbank lending of 
international financial centres was about 11% higher than during non-QE periods. This 
incremental effect is still large and equal to about 12% but significant only at 10% confidence 
11 In these specifications wholesale funding is excluded from the set of controls due to its high correlation with 
SIZE. This is due to the fact that branches located in IFC have a negligible deposit base and most assets are 
financed with wholesale raised funding.  
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level when England is added to the IFC group. This evidence suggests that IFC, which are 
already greatly engaged in intermediating global liquidity in normal times, have increased even 
further their activities in interbank markets during the QE period. 
Table 6. GMM regression estimates, focus on IFC, dependent variable: 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕  
Dependent variable: INT 
Sample: IFC IFC_E (including England) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
DEPNT(-1) -0.960*** 0.004 -0.965*** 0.012 
DEPNT(-2) -0.844*** 0.007 -0.837*** 0.023 
DEPNT(-3) -0.732*** 0.008 -0.752*** 0.014 
GDP(-1) -0.004 0.009 -0.012 0.007 
SIZE(-1) -0.173*** 0.042 -0.164*** 0.038 
DIR(-1) -0.139*** 0.027 -0.020 0.042 
US_GDP_G(-1) -0.663** 0.336 -0.892* 0.470 
US_IR_G(-1) -12.704*** 1.880 -12.360*** 3.665 
QE 1.421*** 0.211 1.312*** 0.455 
RESUS(-1) -24.194*** 1.932 -25.233*** 6.856 
RESUS(-1)*QE 11.241*** 2.893 12.464* 6.696 
Sample 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 
Observations 362 455 
Sargan-Hansen, p-value 0.423 0.145 
AR(2) 0.873 0.868 
Host-countries 4 5 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
4.2 Secondary host countries: Annual data 
Table 7 below reports the estimated of (1) considering the secondary host countries 
sample. The dependent variable in left-hand side specification is ∆ln (loans)i,t  while in the 
other specifications the components of local loans are considered separately. Overall, the 
estimates of the control variables are in line with what observed in the regressions for the core 
locations. However, the effect of the US QE on local loans is somewhat different. Total local 
loans extended by foreign branches of banks located in secondary locations have increased 
significantly during the QE period with the coefficient of the dummy QE being equal to 0.135 
in the left-hand side panel. This is due to an increase in commercial and industrial loans (third 
panel). The last specification of Table 7 reveals a significant augmentation of the effect of QE 
programme on local interbank loans: a 1% increase in excess reserves of US domestically-
located banks amplified the effect of local lending of foreign branches of US banks to other 
banks by about 4.5% during the QE period at a 5% confidence level.  
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The diagnostic tests reported at the bottom of each specification considered in the 
empirical analysis reveal the absence of autocorrelation and the validity of the instruments, 
necessary for the unbiasedness and consistency of the estimators. 
Table 7. GMM regression estimates, local loans breakdown 
Dependent variable: All loans MORTG COMM INT 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
DEPNT(-1) 0.022 0.044 -0.617*** 0.117 -1.013*** 0.211 -0.762*** 0.042 
DEPNT(-2) -0.145** 0.061 -0.286 0.211 -0.693*** 0.215 -0.430*** 0.038 
GDP(-1) 0.028*** 0.006 0.269** 0.119 0.021 0.029 0.083*** 0.013 
SIZE(-1) -0.200*** 0.036 -0.156 2.359 -0.1667 0.185 -1.084*** 0.147 
DIR(-1) -0.013*** 0.004 -0.174** 0.067 -0.042 0.037 -0.010*** 0.002 
US_GDP_G(-1) 0.009 0.012 -0.328 0.251 0.165** 0.072 0.298 0.051 
US_IR_G(-1) 0.095* 0.049 1.339* 0.680 -0.020 0.170 -0.878*** 0.126 
WHOLESALE(-1) -0.379** 0.190 3.399* 2.042 -0.254 0.632 5.260*** 0.583 
QE 0.135*** 0.045 -1.188 1.734 0.976*** 0.368 -0.479 0.409 
RESUS(-1) 0.165*** 0.059 2.408*** 0.865 0.016 0.178 -0.240 0.401 
RESUS(-1)*QE -0.391 0.398 -1.675 3.602 -1.146 1.130 4.461** 1.973 
Sample 1990-2015 1990-2015 2003q4-2015q4 1990-2015 
Observations 433 122 383 78 
Sargan-H., p-value 0.823 0.941 0.890 0.630 
AR(2) 0.715 0.898 0.675 0.129 
Host-countries 21 15 21 12 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
We consider several robustness checks in order to validate the key results presented in 
section 4. Most notably, we re-estimate model (1) by accounting for: (1) geographical areas, 
(2) unconventional monetary policy in other countries and (3) the three QE periods separately.  
Table A.1 in the appendix reports the regression estimates of (1) for regional subgroups 
of host countries, in which the dependent variable is the total amount of lending of foreign 
branches of US global banks. The specification reported in panel (a) considers core host 
countries located in Asia and South America available in the quarterly dataset while in panel 
(b) are reported the regression estimates for the subsample of all other core host countries. In 
panels (c) and (d), instead, (1) is estimated for the Asian and South American and other 
secondary host countries respectively (annual panel). Branches located in the core countries in 
the Asian and South American region have depicted the largest increase in loans in response to 
the US QE, as shown by the estimated coefficient of RESUS(-1)*QE which is strongly 
significant and equal to 13.984. In other core locations, comprising mainly European host 
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countries, on the other hand, there was a significant retrenchment, i.e. at 5% significance level, 
in local lending by US banks via their branches following the US QE policy. In secondary 
locations, on the other hand, the US QE programme has not had any significant effect on local 
lending, albeit results suggest an increase in lending during the US QE period, as depicted by 
the estimated coefficients of QE in columns (c) and (d). Consistent with the previous results, 
there is no significant increase in local lending due to the US QE even when regional 
disaggregation is considered as the estimated coefficient of RESUS(-1)*QE are not significant 
in both specifications in (c) and (d).  
The estimates of the specifications accounting for unconventional monetary policy in 
the Euro area, UK and Japan are reported in Table A.2. This is to control for the possibility that 
a surge in post-crisis global liquidity created by central banks worldwide may have further 
eased the pressure in international lending markets (Avdjiev et al., 2017). Non-US post-2007 
quantitative easing measures are proxied by base money (M0) indices for the UK, M0_UK, the 
Euro area, M0_EA, and Japan, M0_JP 12. In particular, we replicate the previously identified 
channels of transmission of QE activated by US global banks: that is, via real estate and 
commercial loans in core locations and interbank loans in secondary locations. The estimated 
coefficient of RESUS(-1)*QE are robust across specifications (a), (b) and (c) with significant 
and positive estimates, confirming previous findings. Liquidity created by QE programmes in 
the UK and Japan is found to have significantly increased outstanding mortgages by foreign 
branches of US banks in core locations, while the QE programme by the European Central 
Bank has had a positive effect on interbank loans issued in secondary locations.  
An additional battery of robustness checks considers the three different QE waves 
separately. The empirical analysis presented above focuses on the last two waves of the QE 
programme implemented by the Fed, occurring over the two following periods: from 
November 2010 until June 2011 (QE2 – phase 1), from October 2012 until October 2014 (QE2 
– phase 2). Given the emphasis of this paper to uncover the effect of QE on foreign lending, 
the first wave of QE by the Fed was disregarded under the presumption that during that period 
banks retained most of the QE liquidity to make up for losses incurred in their balance sheet 
and to support domestic lending (see Gertler, 2013, for a discussion).  Still, different waves of 
QE might have had heterogeneous impact on international bank lending of US banks. Focusing 
on domestic lending, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017), for instance, show that the third wave 
12 The M0 variables are considered in first differences of the logs; the base of the index is 20001q1.  Sources are 
Bank of England (UK M0), European Central Bank (Euro area M0) and Bank of Japan (Japan M0).  
19 
 
                                                          
of the QE policy by the Federal reserves (i.e. QE2, phase 2) had the largest effect on domestic 
lending, while the second phase (i.e. QE2, phase 1) had no significant effect. In table A.3 in 
the appendix are reported the regression estimates of (1) in which the three waves of QE are 
considered separately by the dummies QE1, QE2_1 and QE2_2 respectively. Specifications 
(a)-(c) and (d)-(f) consider the core and secondary locations respectively. In the core host 
locations in the first two waves of QE there has been a significant decrease in lending by foreign 
branches as the coefficients of QE1 and QE2_1 are negative and significant at 5% confidence 
level. This result is in line with findings by the International Monetary Fund (2015) reporting 
a retrenchment on global banking in the years following the 2007-09 financial crisis. The QE 
implementation in the US has had a positive and significant effect on lending by foreign 
branches of US banks during the last wave of the programme, that is, during the two years 
period spanning from October 2012 to October 2014. Our results thus suggest that the last wave 
of QE programme in the US, which involved a monthly $40 billion purchase of mortgage-
based securities, boosted foreign lending of US banks in their core locations other than their 
domestic lending as found by  Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017). The coefficient of RESUS(-
1)*QE2_2 in column (c) is indeed strongly significant and equal to 8.441. Regression estimates 
for the secondary locations sample in columns (d)-(f) confirm the previous findings of no 
significant impact of any of the three waves of the US QE on lending by foreign branches of 
US global banks. There is indeed evidence of a significant decrease of overall lending of these 
latter in secondary locations during the last wave of the US QE programme. When considering 
interbank loans of foreign branches of secondary locations as dependent variable (Table A.4 in 
the Appendix), a similar pattern arise: only during the third wave of the QE programme by the 
Fed had the effect on foreign interbank lending in secondary locations is amplified 
significantly. The coefficient of RESUS(-1)*QE2_2 in column (c) indeed is positive and 
becomes strongly significant, i.e. at 1% significance level, only when the second phase of QE2 
is considered.  
   
6. Conclusions 
The effects of the unconventional monetary policy measures following the 2007-09 
financial crisis are still to be fully appraised. While much of the academic attention has been 
devoted to understanding the impact of liquidity created by the QE programmes on domestic 
and foreign financial markets, the eventual impact on bank lending remains largely unexplored. 
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This paper has attempted to provide empirical support to the existence of an 
international bank lending channel activated during the QE implementation by US global 
banks. The novel dataset used in this paper contains aggregated balance sheet variables of 
foreign branches of US banks by host country and is perfectly suited for this intent.  
Results point to asymmetric impact of US QE on the lending of foreign branches in 
host-countries. In particular, in those host-countries where these entities have larger activities, 
i.e. core locations, a BLC was activated during the US QE implementation, resulting in an 
increase in branches’ loans secured by real estate and commercial loans. In international and 
offshore financial centres, on the other hand, foreign branches of US banks have significantly 
increased their interbank loans during the QE period. In a similar fashion, in those host-
countries where these entities have smaller activities, i.e. secondary locations, an international 
BLC is activated exclusively via interbank lending. 
Our findings highlight the importance of global banks in transmitting liquidity shocks 
across borders potentially impairing the objectives of both domestic and foreign monetary 
policies. As the 2007-09 global financial crisis has revealed, unsustainable debt levels foster 
financial instabilities and self-fulfilling feedback loops between the banking sector and the real 
economy. Although regulators’ ability to regulated foreign banks operating in their country is 
rather limited, especially in the case of branches, ad-hoc macroprudential tools to limit 
domestic credit may contain eventual pressure on local credit markets due to QE-generated 
liquidity inflows via foreign banks. 
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Appendix 
Fig. 1.a: Long-term deposit and loans of US commercial banks, $bn 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Notes: The series reported in Figure 1.a refer to saving and small time deposits and loans and leases of US commercial banks. These include: 
domestically chartered commercial banks; U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks; and Edge Act and agreement corporations (foreign-
related institutions). Data exclude International Banking Facilities. 
 
Fig. 2.a: Domestic lending rates by country, 2014, annual percentage 
 
Source: IMF. 
Notes: The countries reported in Figure 2.a are those in which US global banks have branches with assets in excess of $250m, as available 
from the FFIEC030 in December 2014. 
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 Table A.1. GMM estimates, regional sub-samples 
Dependent 
variable:  All loans All loans All loans All loans 
Host country 
region: 
Asia and South 
America Other 
Asia and South 
America Other 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
DEPNT(-1) -0.321*** 0.015 -0.325*** 0.055 0.026 0.036 -0.241*** 0.029 
DEPNT(-2) -0.0723*** 0.014 -0.027 0.025 -0.029 0.074 0.033 0.036 
GDP(-1) 0.013*** 0.002 -0.019 0.013 0.032** 0.013 0.053*** 0.005 
SIZE(-1) -0.0678*** 0.012 -0.144*** 0.034 -0.282*** 0.067 -0.135*** 0.024 
DIR(-1) -0.004*** 0.002 0.275*** 0.079 -0.010 0.010 0.011* 0.006 
US_GDP_G(-1) 0.662 0.491 0.054*** 0.019 -0.007 0.020 0.230** 0.070 
US_IR_G(-1) 13.609*** 3.662 0.034 0.105 0.126 0.128 0.033*** 0.014 
WHOLESALE(-1) 0.127*** 0.036 0.534* 0.292 -0.672 0.469 0.470*** 0.121 
QE -0.645 0.437 0.020 0.129 0.248* 0.130 0.146*** 0.051 
RESUS(-1) -8.687*** 1.431 0.117** 0.050 0.341** 0.140 0.071 0.100 
RESUS(-1)*QE 13.984*** 2.190 -1.419** 0.671 -0.528 0.852 -0.025 0.538 
Sample 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 1990-2015 1990-2015 
Frequency Q Q A A 
Observations 1110 1135 250 183 
Sargan-H., p-value 0.660 0.423 0.935 0.328 
AR(2) 0.394 0.656 0.402 0.787 
Host-countries 12 13 12 9 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A.2. GMM estimates, QE in other countries 
Dependent variable:  MORTG COMM INT 
Host-countries: Core Core Secondary 
  (a) (b) (c) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
DEPNT(-1) -0.821*** 0.009 -0.832*** 0.018 -0.647*** 0.027 
DEPNT(-2) -0.304*** 0.011 -0.417*** 0.020 -0.404*** 0.026 
GDP(-1) 0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.012 0.029 0.035 
SIZE(-1) -0.130*** 0.014 -0.092** 0.036 -1.124*** 0.270 
DIR(-1) -0.011*** 0.003 0.033* 0.017 -0.011*** 0.002 
US_GDP_G(-1) -0.306*** 0.022 -0.280 0.290 -0.163 0.215 
US_IR_G(-1) 1.618*** 0.121 0.469 1.178 -0.149 0.495 
WHOLESALE(-1) 0.227*** 0.049 0.052 0.191 4.771*** 1.057 
QE -0.103 0.079 -0.968 1.200 -0.337 0.424 
RESUS(-1) -0.274*** 0.091 -2.643 2.490 -1.722*** 0.626 
RESUS (-1)*QE 2.8780*** 1.027 8.942** 4.663 6.408* 3.564 
M0_EA(-1) 1.355 1.104 -0.850 5.320 1.643*** 0.398 
M0_UK(-1) 2.106*** 0.702 -2.963 6.552 -2.976 2.212 
M0_JP(-1) 2.964*** 1.002 -9.965 7.875 -1.198 1.573 
Sample 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 
Frequency Q Q A 
Observations 1379 1980 78 
Sargan-H., p-value 0.964 0.746 0.426 
AR(2) 0.520 0.904 0.706 
Host-countries 22 23 12 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A.3 
Dependent variable: All loans All loans All loans All loans All loans All loans 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
DEPNT(-1) -0.311*** 0.021 -0.315*** 0.022 -0.394*** 0.029 0.010 0.053 0.024 0.051 0.020 0.035 
DEPNT(-2) -0.071*** 0.017 -0.077*** 0.018 -0.086*** 0.017 -0.171** 0.067 -0.126** 0.051 -0.172*** 0.038 
GDP(-1) 0.011*** 0.003 0.012*** 0.003 0.013** 0.005 0.029*** 0.010 0.028*** 0.005 0.020*** 0.003 
SIZE(-1) -0.065*** 0.013 -0.057*** 0.015 -0.062*** 0.017 -0.188*** 0.043 -0.165*** 0.039 -0.102*** 0.028 
DIR(-1) -0.005*** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.013** 0.006 -0.015*** 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
US_GDP_G(-1) -0.245* 0.129 -0.047 0.158 1.414*** 0.305 -0.007 0.009 0.015 0.037 0.007 0.008 
US_IR_G(-1) 3.807*** 0.317 3.539*** 0.117 3.516*** 0.160 0.129** 0.061 0.105 0.071 0.115*** 0.035 
WHOLESALE(-1) 0.171** 0.066 0.178** 0.076 0.188* 0.104 -0.106 0.259 -0.373* 0.212 -0.341*** 0.126 
RESUS(-1) 0.876* 0.463 0.832* 0.456 -2.719*** 0.732 -0.127 0.468 0.207** 0.093 0.069 0.048 
QE1 -14.008** 6.029         -0.169* 0.096         
QE2_1     -15.334** 6.232         0.196 0.136     
QE2_2         2.232*** 0.747         -0.077** 0.032 
RESUS(-1)*QE1 12.438 12.541         0.424 0.478         
RESUS (-1)*QE2_1     220.003 181.874         0.025 4.413     
RESUS (-1)*QE2_2         8.441*** 2.783         0.229 0.299 
Sample 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 1990q4-2015q4 1990-2015 1990-2015 1990-2015 
Frequency Q Q Q A A A 
Observations 2059 2059 2059 433 433 433 
Sargan-H., p-value 0.116 0.118 0.196 0.513 0.678 0.495 
AR(2) 0.556 0.870 0.773 0.119 0.108 0.189 
Host-countries 23 23 23 21 21 21 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A.4. GMM estimates, three QE waves 
Dependent variable: INT INT INT 
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
  (a) (b) (c) 
DEPNT(-1) -0.638*** 0.077 -0.812*** 0.040 -0.801*** 0.037 
DEPNT(-2) -0.340*** 0.061 -0.431*** 0.034 -0.425*** 0.030 
SIZE(-1) -1.612*** 0.190 -0.853*** 0.107 -1.354*** 0.101 
GDP(-1) 0.065** 0.030 0.114*** 0.004 0.081*** 0.011 
DIR(-1) -0.002 0.023 -0.009*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.004 
US_GDP_G(-1) 0.405*** 0.080 0.113*** 0.037 0.364*** 0.036 
US_IR_G(-1) -0.606** 0.288 -0.717*** 0.147 -0.967*** 0.148 
WHOLESALE(-1) 9.050*** 1.536 5.632*** 0.315 6.917*** 0.722 
RESUS(-1) -1.341 3.862 -0.553 0.358 0.113 0.391 
QE1 0.448 1.015         
QE2_1     -1.926*** 0.141     
QE2_2         0.624** 0.282 
RESUS(-1)*QE1 0.814 4.656         
RESUS(-1)*QE2_1     -2.238 7.880     
RESUS(-1)*QE2_2         2.774*** 0.714 
Sample 1990-2015 1990-2016 1990-2017 
Frequency A A A 
Observations 78 78 78 
Sargan-H., p-value 0.446 0.814 0.513 
AR(2) 0.532 0.108 0.100 
Host-countries 12 12 12 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of generalized method of moments panel regression using an orthogonal deviation estimator (system 
estimator). DEPNT(p) variable refers to lagged dependent variable. AR(2) tests are obtained from the GMM differenced estimators. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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